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Anderson: Montana's Survival Statute - A Constitutional Quandry

NOTES
MONTANA'S SURVIVAL STATUTE-A CONSTITUTIONAL
QUANDRY
INTRODUCTION
In 1961 the Thirty-seventh Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana enacted into law the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure1 (hereinafter
M. R. Civ. P.). With the enactment of these rules, prior statutes deemed
inconsistent therewith were repealed. One such statute, apparently repealed by mistake, was the General Survival Statute' which was shown as
superseded by Rule 25, M. R. Civ. P. and as repealed by section 84 of the
Act. Because of this apparent mistake, the 1963 Legislature reenacted the
Survival Statute, the reenactment to take effect retroactively as of January
1, 1962, the date that the M. R. Civ. P. went into effect.
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the constitutional questions
raised by this statute and to determine whether the Montana judiciary when
faced with the issue, can properly decide that the statute can be applied
retroactively without violating the constitution.
I.
The Montana Constitution, Article 3, section 11 provides: "No ex post
facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making any
irrevocable grant of special privileges, franchises or immunities shall be
passed by the legislative assembly." In considering retroactive application of statutes, this constitutional provision was interpreted by the Montana court in Bullard v. Smith' in these words: "It follows that the legislature was therefore untrammeled and free, in so far as constitutional provisions were concerned, to pass any retrospective laws which did not violate
the obligations of contracts or interfere with any vested rights.' I
It is a generally accepted principle of constitutional law that if a
statute is procedural in nature, a retroactive application of the statute does
not interfere with vested rights, for "the right to a particular remedy is
not a vested right. "' As another author phrased the conclusion, "A statute
providing a remedy where none existed previously is valid, as are statutes
providing new remedies and applying them to past transactions. Retroactive laws affecting procedure will be sustained."' That the Montana
court has recognized this principle is demonstrated by the language in
Durocher v. Myers,, wherein the court said: "Laws which have a retroactive
'LAWS OF MONT. 1961, ch. 13.
9
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,

1947, § 93-2824.
tana, 1947, will be cited R.C.M.).

'LAWS OF MONT. 1963, ch.

(Hereinafter Revised Codes of Mon-

14.

'28 Mont. 387, 72 Pac. 761 (1903).
'Id. at 397, 72 Pac. at 763. (Emphasis added).
'2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 754 (8th ed. 1927).
'2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTTrruTION § 2210 (3d ed. 1943).
8 84 Mont. 225, 274 Pac. 1062 (1929).
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effect are clearly valid, where they merely add to the means of enforcing
existing obligations and are just and reasonable.. .
On the other hand, it has been held that a retroactive application of a
statute affecting substantive matters may interfere with vested rights. Thus
in Cusick v. Feldpausch' the Michigan court, in determining whether the
repeal of a statute upon which liability was predicated forced the abatement of a cause of action which had arisen prior to the repeal, said :'
This is not a case involving a mere change in remedy or procedure,
and cases cited in that regard are not in point. The statute provides a rule of substantive law. (citations omitted) The effect of
the change, if given retrospective effect, would be to deprive plaintiff and others similarly situated of right of action. This court has
recognized that a common-law right of action is property and entitled to protection. (citations omitted) By the weight of authority, a statutory right of action for damage to person or property,
which has accrued, is a vested right, and likewise to be protected.
The rule is otherwise in respect of remedy, of mere penalties, of
procedure, and of rights merely inchoate or expectant.
Whether survival statutes are substantive or procedural is not certain.
In fact, there would seem to be no persuasive argument against holding the
same statute procedural for one purpose and substantive for another. Professor Walter Wheeler Cook has suggested that "If ...we examine into
the distinction between 'substantive law' and 'remedial or procedural law'
as that distinction is involved in legal problems, we find that this distinction
is drawn for a number of different purposes, each involving its own social,
economic, or political problems. "
If it is once admitted that the terms "vested," "substantive," and
"procedural" are relative terms, most often used to explain or justify a
conclusion perhaps the problems becomes clear. As Cook explained, each
distinction between substance and procedure involves its own social, economic, or political problems. To say that certain rights are to be protected
because they are "vested rights" begs the question. It must be determined
which rights are to be protected and which are to be subject to infringement in light of the interests and the policy considerations involved. "By
vested right can be meant no more than those rights which under particular
circumstances will be protected from legislative interference. "'i
To demonstrate his thesis, Professor Cook enumerates eight legal problems, indicating how a court might differ in its interpretation of the same
statute depending upon the considerations involved. For example, he lists
the constitutional problem in retroactive application of a law, indicating
that constitutional objections are overcome if the statute is found to be
procedural. Again, he suggests the conflicts of law problem wherein a
court must determine whether a particular law is substantive or procedural
in order to apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law
Id. at 232 274 Pac. at 1065.
"259 Mich. 349, 243 N.W. 226 (1932).
Id.at 227.

"Cook, "Sub8tance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 342

(193=-.-).

'Supra note 7 at § 2205.
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of the foreign state. Dependent upon the interests affected and the policies
to be effectuated, a court might well hold the same statute to be procedural
for one purpose and substantive for another.
The California court, in two recent cases, was confronted with the
problem posed by Professor Cook in the examples above. In Cort v. Steen,"
the California court held that its survival statute was substantive for purposes of retroactive application. In Grant v. McAuliffe,' the same court
held that the same statute was procedural for purposes of conflicts of law,
determining that the California statute could be applied in an action commenced in California, although based upon a personal injury inflicted in
Arizona. The court, in the Grant case, said: " [A] statute or other rule
of law will be characterized as substantive or procedural according to the
nature of the problem for which a characterization must be made.' '
Although the California court determined that its survival statute
was substantive for purposes of retroactivity, it is submitted that that
decision should not be of controlling force in resolving the problem presented in Montana. In the Cort case, the California court had no legislative
expression of intent to guide it, and concluded that in the absence of such
an indication, the legislature probably intended the act to be applied only
prospectively." In contrast, the Montana court has an express indication
of intent by the Montana Legislature that the statute be applied retroactiveThree years after the Cort decision, the California court in the Grant
case, speaking through Justice Traynor, advanced some persuasive logic
for the position that survival statutes can be construed as procedural.
While Justice Traynor was concerned with an application of the statute
in a conflicts problem, his reasoning provides a sound basis for solution
of the constitutional question here under consideration. After a review of
the cases holding both ways on the question, the court stated :"
Many of the cases ... holding that survival is substantive ... confused the problems involved in survival of causes of action with
those involved in causes of action for wrongful death... The problems are not analogous. A cause of action for wrongful death is
statutory. It is a new cause of action-vested in the widow or next
of kin, and arises on the death of the injured person. Before his
death, the injured person himself has a separate and distinct cause
of action and, if it survives, the same cause of action can be enforced by the personal representative of the deceased against the
tortfeasor. The survival statutes do not create a new cause of
action, as do the wrongful death statutes . . . They merely pre-

vent the abatement of the cause of action of the injured person,
and provide for its enforcement by or against the personal representative of the deceased.
There is one argument for the proposition that survival statutes are
procedural that seems persuasive. The Montana statute provides that
136 Cal. 2d 437, 224 P.2d 723 (1950).
'41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
"Id. at 948.
"'Supranote 14 at 725.
ULAws OF MONT. 1963, ch. 14.
'Supra note 15 at 947. (Emphasis added).
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"an action, or cause of action, or defense shall not abate by death'" of
either party, or if the action has not yet been begun or the defense interposed, the action may be begun or the defense set up in the name of the
representative or successor in interest. Thus the statute provides that
neither the death of the injured party or of the tortfeasor shall abate an
action or cause of action or defense. If we assume that the injured party
commences an action, and that the tortfeasor dies, either before the action
is commenced or while the action is pending, the action which the injured party is allowed to enforce against the personal representative of
the tortfeasor is surely not a new cause of action. It is nothing more than
the original cause of action, based on the injury originally inflicted, with
the statute providing a remedy for enforcement of the action. It seems
clear in this instance that the statute merely provides a procedural device for enforcing an existing cause of action.
If it is the injured person who dies while an action is pending or
before it has been instituted, the analogy is not quite so clear. However,
as Justice Traynor pointed out in the Grant case, the action which the
personal representative enforces is the same cause of action that the injured party possessed at his death. Again, the statute is merely providing a remedy for enforcing an existing cause of action.
The Montana court has considered the question whether a survival
statute is substantive or procedural, although not for purposes of retroactive application of the statute. In Dillon v. Great Northern Railway
Co.' the court said: "Every survival statute presupposes the existence of
a cause of action in favor of the injured party. Such a statute does not
create a new cause of action, but only carries forward the right which the
injured party had before his death.'"
Thus it is obvious that the Montana court contemplated that the survival statute provided merely a
remedy for the continuance of the cause of action which existed prior to
the death.
One other question might be presented to the court when it determines whether the survival statute is substantive or procedural for constitutional purposes. The legislature, in reenacting the statute, purported
to determine that the statute is substantive in nature.' It may be argued
that this Legislative determination is binding upon the court. It is submited that the court should not feel bound by this legislative determination, for the matter is properly one for judicial interpretation. Article 4,
section 1 of the Montana Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments: The legislative, executive, and judicial,
and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall
exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Nothing in the Constitution allows the Legislature to determine
whether a statute is procedural or substantive in nature. Because of the
2'Supra note 18.
"38 Mont. 485, 100 Pac. 960 (1909).
2I1. at 492, 100 Pac. at 962. (Empbasis added).
'Supra note 18.
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separation of powers doctrine under which our government operates, it
would be an incongruity for the Legislature to enact legislation and at
the same time determine its constitutionality. To hold that the Legislature can determine whether a statute is procedural would, in some cases,
be paramount to enabling that body to determine constitutionality of its
Acts, for as noted previously, "retroactive laws affecting procedure will
be sustained."' Therefore, the Legislature would need only recite that
it considered certain legislation to be procedural and there could be no
question concerning its retroactive application. Such a position would
be contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. Constitutional questions of retroactive application of statutes must remain for the final determination of the courts, upon whom rests -the duty of deciding whether
legislative actions fall within constitutional limitations.
Thus, while the Montana Legislature undertook to determine that the
survival statute is substantive law, it is submitted that the recital is of
no validity and constitutes nothing more than surplus verbiage, particularly when the expressed intent of retroactivity is considered.
Even if the contention above be rejected, the court can still find that
the statute is procedural. The Montana court, in Shapard v. City of
Missoula,' said :'
While the general rule of construction requires every word found
in a statute to be given force and effect, nevertheless, when words
or expressions are found therein to which no meaning can be assigned consistent with the legislative intent as collected from the
entire act, such words and expressions are to be treated as surplusage and wholly disregarded.
It is to be noted that the court spoke of the legislative intent as collected from the entire Act. In the present situation the Legislature would
seem to have had two intents: first and foremost, that the statute be applied retroactively and second, that the statute be interpreted as substantive in order to effectuate the primary intent of retroactive application.
It is apparent that the Legislature misconstrued the law dealing with the
constitutional questions involved. Should the court find that the legislative intent of retroactivity would be thwarted by a finding that the
statute is substantive, it should feel free to disregard the recital as to the
nature of the statute.
As a third basis by which the court could effectuate the intent of the
Legislature, it could substitute the word "procedural" for the word
"substantive" in the Act. The Montana court has recognized that this
action may also be proper, saying in Pomeroy v. State Board of Equalizatione that "Words may be changed in a statute in order to compel its
conformity with the intention of the legislature.'"
One eminent author
in the field of statutory construction has expressed the same general
principle in these terms: "Courts have permitted the substitution of
942

SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTITUTION

§ 2210 (3d ed. 1943).

Mont. 269, 141 Pac. 544 (1914).
2Id. at 276, 141 Pac. at 546.
2799 Mont. 534, 45 P.2d 316 (1935).
OI. at 538, 45 P.2d at 318.
249
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. where it is obvious that the word used in the
mistake.'"'

It is conceded that most of the cases in which a word is substituted
or changed involve cases of typographical error, and no case in point could
be found. However, the same principles should be applicable to obvious
errors where, as here, it is apparent that the Legislature misunderstood
the constitutional basis of the problem with which it dealt. The primary
intention of the Legislature is clear-that the statute be applied retroactively. If the court feels that the statute can be found to be procedural,
and determines that such a finding is necessary for a retroactive application of the statute, then the court should feel free to so hold.
It has sometimes been said that retroactive laws are suspect because
they make the law uncertain. It is argued that persons have relied upon
the law as it stood at the time of the transaction. While this argument
has validity in the field of contracts, it seems highly doubtful when applied to the law of torts. It would seem must unlikely that a tortfeasor
relies upon the fact that he might not be subject to suit when he commits
a tort, particularly in the personal injury field.
As has been noted, the cases and authorities are not in accord on
the question presented. The Montana court should feel free to arrive at
its own decision. Inherent in the court's determination will necessarily
arise such factors as the primary intent of the Legislature that the statute
be applied retroactively; the fact of probable mistaken repeal of the statute
by the 1961 Legislature; a determination to the court's own satisfaction
whether the statute can properly be characterized as procedural if such
is necessary for retroactive application, at least for purposes of the constitutional question here involved; a determination of whether public
policy requires that the statute be enforced retroactively in order to provide a remedy for injuries incurred while the statute was repealed; and
the fact that the Montana court has previously held, in the Dillon case,
that the statute is procedural. While that case is not determinative of
the question here presened, it should be persuasive, especially when coupled with the legislative intent and the policies to be effectuated.
Ii.
Assuming then that the court has fairly determined whether the
statute is procedural or substantive, can the statute properly be applied
retroactively ?
As to injuries inflicted after the repeal, but where death did not occur
until after the reenacted statute went into effect, the statute should clearly
be applicable if it is found to be procedural.
Three Texas cases considered this exact question, and each time the
court determined that the representative could maintain the suit.' In
the first of those three suits, Houston and Texas Central Railroad Co. v.
8

Supra note 25 at § 4925.
'Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. Rogers, 39 S.W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; City of
Marshall v. McAllister, 43 S.W 1043 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) ; Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry.of Tex. v. Settle, 47 S.W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App 1898).
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Rogers,' the injury occurred prior to the passage of the statute allowing
survival of the cause of action. Subsequent to its passage, Rogers, the
injured person, died. His wife was allowed to prosecute the action which
had accrued to Rogers during his lifetime, the court saying :'
At the time this act went into effect there was a valid cause of
action existing in favor of James Rogers against the appellant.
The passage of the act by the legislature authorizing the survival
of suits . . . did not interfere with any vested right of the ap-

pellant, and was not contrary to the constitution.
The Texas court spoke only in terms of prospective application of
the statute, obviously feeling that the application which it was allowing
was not retroactive. The act upon which the action was predicated was
phrased in terms of prospective application, providing that "From and
after the passage of this act'' actions should survive.
The same court, in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. of Texas
v. Settle,' in answer to the contention that the law was retroactive, said :'
It is contended that, because the cause of action accrued before the
passage of the act, the law is retroactive in its effect, and is therefore unconstitutional . . . Settle was alive, and the cause of action
was in existence (at the time of the passage of the act) . . . inas-

much as the right of action was perfect when the statute was
passed, it was within the power of the legislature to prevent the
loss of it in the future through Settle's death.
Thus, if the statute is procedural, it is submitted that an application
of the statute in the factual situation proposed should be proper. Such
an application would not be retroactive but strictly prospective in nature,
and there should be no question of interference with vested rights. The
Montana court should follow the reasoning of the Texas court.
However, if the injury was inflicted after the repeal, but death occurred prior to the reenactment, an application of the statute would clearly seem to be retroactive.
In order to hold that the statute may constitutionally be applied retroactively, the Montana court must find that there will be no interference
with vested rights. If the statute is found to be procedural, then a retroactive application of the statute should be proper. As noted earlier, the
Montana court has held that "Laws which have a retroactive effect are
clearly valid, where they merely add to the means of enforcing existing
obligations and are just and reasonable.'
Should the court find that the statute is substantive, then it must
determine whether a retroactive application of the statute will interfere
with any vested rights.
Again it would seem that a proper approach to the problem of classifying the statute requires an inquiry into the interests to be affected
'Supra note 31.
Old. at 1113.
"Id. at 1112.
"Supra note 31.
81. at 827.
Durocher v. Myers, 84 Mont. 225, 232, 274 Pac. 1062, 1065 (1929).
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and the policies to be effectuated. Although a court might feel that this
statute should properly be considered as substantive for certain purposes,
it is submitted that Professor Cook's thesis and the approach adopted by
the California court is sound. Should the Montana court determine, after
a thorough analysis of all the interests involved, that justice will be best
served by a retroactive application of the statute, it can properly reach
this end by adopting Professor Cook's approach. On this basis, an application of the statute to situations in which the death occurred prior
to the reenactment would violate no constitutional safeguards.
III.
Another problem certain to arise relates to the original repeal of the
survival statute in 1961. What happened to causes of action which had
arisen, but had not yet been filed? Second, what happened to causes of
action pending at the time of the repeal?
It is settled that a statute providing for survival of causes of action
is not a codification of the common law, and that no such right existed at
common law." The right of the representative to maintain the suit is
based solely on the statutory declaration of the remedy.
Under the orthodox view those causes of action, whether pending or
not, abated with the repeal of the statute upon which they depended in
the absence of a saving clause. As expressed by the California court in
Callet v. Alioto,' the general rule is:'
[T]hat a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls
with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute ...
The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are
pursued with full realization that the Legislature may abolish
the right to recover at any time.
That the Montana Legislature intended this position to be followed
by the Montana court is evidenced by R.C.M. 1947, section 43-512, which
provides: "Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when it is
otherwise provided therein. Persons acting under any statute are deemed
to have acted in contemplation of this power of repeal."
This legislative
pronouncement is in accord with the general principle enunciated in the
Callet case, and as expressed by Sutherland :'0
The effect of the repeal of a statute where neither a saving clause
nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule
for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the
repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the
statute which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed.
The Montana court, in Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co.,.'
adopted and followed the orthodox rule, saying that "It is the general
*Dillon v. Great No. Ry., 38 Mont. 485, 100 Pac. 960 (1909) ; Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.
2d 437, 224 P.2d 723 (1950).
'210 Cal. 65, 290 Pac. 438 (1930).
Icd. at 440.
01 SUTERMLAND, STATUTORY CONSITUTION § 2042 (3d ed. 1943).
"63 Mont. 223, 207 ac, 116 (1922).
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rule that the repeal of a statute without any reservation takes away all
the remedies existing under the repealed act, and defeats all actions pending under it at the time of its repeal.'"
In that case, plaintiff's filed suit against the defendant corporation,
alleging that the directors of the corporation had incurred debts exceeding the subscribed capital stock of the corporation. The statute under
which the action was brought provided that "The directors of corporations must not. .. create debts beyond their subscribed capital stock ..."
The statute went on to provide that in case of violation of this provision,
the directors were jointly and severally liable to the corporation and the
creditors thereof to the full amount of the debt contracted. After judgment was recovered, but before it was satisfied, the Legislature amended
the statute in question, deleting the provisions noted above in italics" The
question for the court was whether the amendment operated to destroy the
right to recover against the directors. The court held that the right was
destroyed, saying that the repeal of the portion of the statute imposing
liability took away the remedy. Thus, the Montana court followed the
orthodox rule and actions which had not yet been completed were abated.
The Continental Oil case was overruled by the Montana court in Continental Supply Co. v. Abell," the court expressly stating that it overruled
the prior case. However, it is submitted that the Abell case is completely
distinguishable on its facts, that the court had absolutely no reason to
overrule the Continental Oil case and that the language to that effect
constitutes nothing more than dicta.
In the Abell case, the directors of a corporation had failed to meet
statutory requirements relating to the filing of a financial report of the
corporation." Subsequently, the statute which imposed liability on the
directors for failure to file this report was amended, but the amendment
did not remove the liability of the directors, nor delete from the statute
the language upon which the liability was predicated. It will be remembered that the amendment in the Continental Oil case did delete the language upon which liability was predicated. The court, in determining
whether the cause of action in Abell abated, held that it did not. The
court placed its holding on the requirement of section 4 of the Revised
Codes of 1921 which provided:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof
are to be strictly construed has no application to the Codes or
other statutes of the state of Montana. The Codes establish the
law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate and
their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote
justice.
The court also noted that section 93, Revised Codes of 1921 applied.
That section provided:
Where a section or a part of a statute is amended, it is not to be
considered as having been repealed and reenacted in the amended
'Old.at 230, 207 Pac. at 118.
"REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1921,
"LAWS OF MONT. 1919, ch. 37.

§ 3837.

95 Mont. 148, 24 P.2d 133 (1933).

"REvIsE CODES OF MONTANA, 1921, § 6003.
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form, but the portions which are not altered are to be considered
as having been the law from the time when they were enacted, and
the new provisions are to be considered as having been enacted at
the time of the amendment. (Emphasis added.)
In the light of these two provisions, the court felt that it was required to hold that the cause of action was not abated by the amendment.
It is submitted that the court achieved the correct result, i.e., the cause of
action did not abate, but arrived at this result for the wrong reasons.
The court noted the general rule prevailing in all jurisdictions to the
effect that when a statute is 7
'amended so as to read as follows' and closes with the provision
that 'all Acts and Parts of Acts in conflict herewith are hereby
repealed,' the legislature evinces 'an intention to make the new
Act a substitute for the old one and that so much only of the
original Act as is repeated in the new one is continued in force,
and all portions omitted from the new Act are repealed.'
The court was concerned however that this was a rule of strict construction, and argued that section 4 quoted supra requires a liberal construction. The court had no occasion to be concerned with this problem,
for even under the rule of strict construction the cause of action would
not have abated.
Section 93 of the 1921 Code is declaratory of the general rule of
statutory construction, and accords with the court's explanation of the
general rule set out above. Thus, when a statute is amended, portions
which are not altered are considered as having been the law from the
time they were first enacted. Since the amendment with which the court
was concerned in the Abell case did not alter the language upon which
liability of the directors was predicated, the court was correct in declaring that the cause of action did not abate. The amendment had no effect
upon the liability of the directors at all.
To reach this result it was entirely superfluous for the court to declare
that the Continental Oil holding was overruled, since the court had no
occasion to consider the question. The elements of statutory construction
involved in the two cases were entirely different and distinct. The Montana court should reexamine the holding in Abell in regard to the overruling of the decision in Continental Oil. That case states the generally
accepted rule of statutory construction when an amendment repeals a
statute upon which liability is predicated. At least it states the general
rule where the cause of action has no common law background, but is
strictly of a statutory nature, as is the case with actions based on survival
statutes."$

'7Supra note 46 at 161-62, 24 P.2d at 136-37.

"Supra note 38. The rule in respect of common law causes of action which have
been codified has been stated thus:
This rule (that a cause of action or remedy dependent upon a statute falls with
a repeal of the statute) only applies when the right in question is a statutory
right and does not apply to an existing right of action which has accrued to a
person under the rules of the common law, or by virtue of a statute
codifying the common law. In such a case, it is generally stated that the cause
of action is a vested property right which may not be impaired . . .Callet v.
Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 290 Pac. 438, 440 (1930).
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T'he repealing statute contains no saving clause as to actions not
pending at the time of repeal."' Further, there is no general saving statute
in the Codes.' Therefore, it would seem that those causes of action which
had arisen prior to the repeal but which had not yet been filed at that date
should be found to have abated.
As to actions pending at the time of the repeal, the principles enunciated above should control except in so far as they were preserved by
the saving clause in the repealing statute. Rule 86 of the M. R. Civ. P.
provided:
(a) Effective Date and Application to Pending Proceedings.
These rules will take effect on January 1, 1962. They govern all
proceedings and actions brought after they take effect, and also
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be
feasible, or would work injustice, in which event the procedure
existing at the time the action was brought applies.
In view of the discretion vested in the court by the clause above, a
court could have taken any of three alternative positions: that the action
abated; that the action could be prosecuted to a final conclusion; that the
court would take the matter under advisement, waiting to see whether the
Legislature would reenact the statute with retroactive effect. Since the
alleged error in repealing the statute was discovered almost immediately
after the promulgation of the M. R. Civ. P., many courts may have taken
pending actions under advisement.
IV.
Assuming that the court were to find that the statute states a rule
of substantive law, what then would be the effect upon actions, whether
pending or not yet filed, of the repeal of the statute upon which they
were predicated?
It has been held that "the repeal of a statute does not take away the
plaintiff's cause of action under it for damages for an injury to person or
property."'
It has further been held that this doctrine applies to causes
of action based solely upon statute, ' as well as to causes of action which
have a common law basis.' Cusick v. Feldpausch," a Michigan case, distinguished between substantive and procedural statutes, stating that if a
statute was substantive in nature, then although the cause of action was
1961, ch. 13.
Ithas been contended that R.C.M. 1947, § 12-206 is a general saving statute. That
section provides that "No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes
effect, and no right accrued, is affected by its provisions, but the proceedings therein must conform to the requirements of this code as far as applicable." However,
the court has made it clear that this statute does not in any sense constitute a general saving statute, and that its only function was as an emergency measure to
prevent loss of rights and abatement of actions upon adoption of the code. Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223, 207 Pac. 116 (1922).
'Lewis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 220 Pa. 317, 69 Atl. 821, 823 (1908).
"Cusick v. Feldpausch, 259 Mich. 349, 243 N.W. 226 (1932).
5Supra note 52.
"Supra note 53.
"9LAws OF MONT.
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predicated solely upon statutory authority, a repeal of the statute could
not divest the plaintiff of a cause of action which had arisen prior to the
repeal.
Contra to the holding in Cusick, other courts have held that even
though a statute be substantive in nature, if the action has no common
law basis then a repeal of the statute abates the cause of action in the absence of a saving clause.'
In deciding this question, the court must again refer to the interests
to be affected and the policies that are intended to be effectuated. Should
the court hold that those causes of action that accrued prior to the repeal
were vested rights, and that the repeal of the statute had no effect on
them, then it will be faced with the question of how to protect these rights.
Undoubtedly some actions have not been commenced because of the repeal. Suppose that the statute of limitations has now run. If these were
vested rights, then it would seem that the failure to prosecute the action
amounts to laches on the part of the plaintiffs, and the action should be
barred. The court will be determining, by an after the fact consideration,
that the actions could have properly been instituted at any time, even
though the statute had been repealed.
If the court feels that the interest to be protected is the right to
pursue the remedy and that public policy demands that a retroactive
application of the statute be allowed in order to provide a remedy for injuries inflicted during the period of repeal, then the court could better
achieve this result by holding that the causes abated with the repeal. By
finding that the statute is procedural and properly retroactive, the court
could then reinstate those causes of action which abated.
V.
Assuming that the statute is held to be procedural, and that it can
constitutionally be applied retroactively, what is the status of those causes
of action that had not been filed at the date of repeal? If they are held
to have abated with the repeal, can they now be reinstated? The court
should hold that these actions can be reinstated.
The evident intent of the Legislature in making the statute retroactive to the date of repeal was to reinstate the remedy as though it had
never been repealed. In this way a remedy is provided for injuries inflicted during the period that the repeal was effective as well as for those
causes that had accrued prior to repeal, but which were lost due to the
repeal. If the statute can constitutionally be applied retroactively, actions
which accrued prior to repeal should be reinstated, as of the date of reenactment, in exactly the same position in which they stood at the date of
repeal.
The court will, in the event that the solution above is accepted, be
forced to a determination of the effect of the statute of limitations upon
5Callet v. Alioto, supra note 49. The court in that case, and in the cases cited by the
court, distinguished between actions based on the common law and actions based
strictly on statute, rather than distinguishing between substantive and procedural
ftatutes,
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/2
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those causes which were held to have abated. While there is apparently
no authority exactly in point, the court can analogize to other instances in
which a suspension of the statute of limitations is allowed.
In certain situations the Montana Legislature has provided for a
tolling of the statute of limitations. Where the person against whom a
cause of action has accrued is out of the state, the statute is suspended
during his absence.' If a person entitled to bring an action is under certain
disabilities, such as insanity, minority, or imprisonment the statute does not
run.' The Legislature has also provided that the statute shall be suspended
for a certain period of time where the person entitled to bring the action
dies before commencing the action,' or where a person against whom a
cause of action exists dies outside the state.'
The Legislature has demonstrated an intent that a person shall not
lose the right to commence and prosecute an action through no fault of his
own. The general rule has been stated thus :'
If a party without any fault of his own has been deprived of his
remedy by some superior power, it has been held that the statute
will not run while the disability continues, although it is not an
exception (specifically mentioned) in the statute.
In San Francisco Say. Union v. Irwin'1 it was held that "no statutes
ean run against one to whom the courts are closed for the maintenance of
his claim.'" While the facts in that case were diferent than those presented
by the question here under consideration, it is submitted that the intent
behind the pronouncement is the same as that which motivated the Montana
Legislature when it enacted the statutes discussed above. The same considerations should govern the present problem.
Causes of action which had not yet been filed at the time of the repeal
should be reinstated. Pending actions, if held to have abated, should be
reinstated. If the courts allowed actions pending to be completed under
the saving statute, no problem exists. As to those actions taken under atvisement, if any were, they should now be concluded.
VI.
There is no question that the authorities conflict upon the disposition
to be made of the many questions raised by the attempted retroactive application of a statute. A strong argument can be made for the proposition that the survival statute is in fact substantive in nature." Should
the Montana court determine that the statute is substantive, then it will
1947, § 93-2702.
56R.C.M.
M
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2703.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2704.
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2705.
0054 0.J.S. idmitation of Actions § 216 (1948).
6128 Fed. 708 (D. Cal. Cir. 1886), aff d 136 U.S. 578 (1890).
11d, at 715.
"See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 437, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) for the discussion and
cases cited therein. See also Rodriquez v. Terry, 79 Ariz. 348, 290 P.2d 248 (1955),
where the Arizona court considered the decision of the California court in Grant v.
McAuliffe but refused to follow that case, holding that a survival statute Is substantive so far as Arizona law is concerned.
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be faced with the question of whether a retroactive application will interfere with vested rights.
For example, since the survival statute is strictly statutory in nature,
with no common law basis," is a defense based upon the absence of a statute
a vested right? A defense has been held to be a vested right. In Lewis v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.' the court said that "a legal exemption from a
demand made by another is a vested right, which the Legislature may not
interfere with. Even an expressed purpose that an act shall have such
retroactive effect is without avail... . "' In that case the defense was based
upon a statute which provided for no liability. The plaintiff argued that
the repeal of the statute after the accident abated the defense and that an
action for damages could be maintained. The court held that the action
could not be maintained, saying that"
The repeal of the act of 1868 makes railroad companies liable under
circumstances which before exempted them. It is entirely competent for the Legislature to make such changes, and impose liability where none was before, but legislation of this kind cannot
operate retrospectively, but must be confined to future occurrences.
Based upon the reasoning of the court in the Lewis case, if the Montana court determined that the survival statute is substantive, it might well
find that a retroactive application of the statute would be unconstitutional
in that it interferes with vested rights by abrogating defenses.
Suppose that an injury was inflicted after the repeal, but that death
did not occur until after the reenacted statute became effective. If the
statute is found to be substantive, the court will have to resolve at least
one difficult problem. At what time did the cause of action in the personal representative accrue; at the time of death, or at the time of the
injury?
If the action accrued at the time of death, then it would seem that the
statute, through strictly a prospective application, might be made applicable since the statute was in effect at the date of death.
However, if the action accrued at the time of the injury, then an
application of the statute would be retroactive. The court then must
determine whether any vested rights will be affected by a retroactive application of the statute.
The Texas court, in Slate v. City of Fort Worth,' was faced with a
similar problem, although the statute there in question was in the nature
of a wrongful death statute rather than a survival statute. In that case,
at the time of injury no cause of action would lie. However, the statute
was amended and at the date of death an action would lie. The court
said that since "the foundation of the action is the act or omission which
causes the injury" and since the statute is substantive in nature, a
"'Dillon v. Great No. Ry., 38 Mont. 485, 100 Pac. 960 (1909) ; Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.
2d 437, 224 P.2d 723 (1950).
"220 Pa. 317, 69 Atl. 821 (1908).
1dI.at 822.
wIbid.

"193 S.W. 1143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
"Id, at 1144.
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cause of action will not lie based upon the injury inflicted prior to the
amendment. The court held that such an application of the statute would
be retroactive and contrary to the Constitution. Since there was no expression of legislative intent that the statute be applied retroactively, the
court had no occasion to consider the question of whether any vested rights
would be affected by such an application. "
CONCLUSION
The problem posed by the Montana Legislature is not an easy one.
There are many facets of the problem which will require the Montana
court to exercise sound judgment in an attempt to achieve the legislative
expression of intent and to effectuate paramount policy choices. It is a
general rule that the legislative expression of intent must be given controlling force if possible. The Montana court expressed this rule in
Tipton v. Sands :'
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of legislative
action. The court must determine not whether it is possible to
condemn, but whether it is possible to uphold the Act which is attacked; every presumption being in favor of its validity.
It is submitted that the court can achieve this end in the manner indicated above. The court need not fear that a deteration that the statute
is procedural for purposes of the constitutional question of retroactive
application binds it to this determination for all questions which might
arise in the future. As noted by Professor Cook, the distinction between
substantive and procedural law is "drawn for a number of different purposes, each involving its own social, economic, or political problems.' m
The Montana court has previously held the survival statute to be procedural.'" Public policy, coupled with the court's prior decision and the
legislative intent provide the court with a solid basis for such a decision.
The court should find the statute to be procedural, at least for purposes
of retroactive application. This would not be an eneroachment upon constitutional safeguards.
ROBERT G. ANDERSON

ROADBLOOKS AND THE LAW OF ARREST IN MONTANA
INTRODUCTION
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 94-6030 provides:
The duly elected or appointed law enforcement officers of this
state, and their deputies, are hereby authorized to establish,...
temporary roadblocks on the highways of this state for the purpose
of identifying drivers, and apprehending persons wanted for viola"I1bid.
'103 Mont. 1, 16, 60 P.2d 662, 669 (1966)..
."Cook, "Substance" and "Prooedure" in the ConfUct of Laws, 42 YAi
(1932-33)."Dillon v. Great No. Ry., supra note 65.
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